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In order to study the Turkey–Armenia relations in past and present times and their pro-
cesses, the current paper, taking into account geopolitical views, tries to analyze the po-
litical and economic consequences of normalization of Turkey–Armenia relationships.
With respect to the outcome of this research, it seems, expansion of such ties would
beneﬁt Ankara, only if the national interests of other regional states are taken into account.
In other words, ignoring the interests of other regional states in the course of normali-
zation of Turkey–Armenia relations would damage the Turkish interests and its relations
with Azerbaijan and Georgia. From the point of views of inﬂuential regional powers, too,
the possible consequences of expansion of Turkey–Armenia ties would accompany
particular complexities. With the expansion of such ties, we may see a kind of balance of
inﬂuence between proﬁt seeking powers in the region.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the formation of modern Turkey, its relations with
neighboring countries have become the longstanding de-
bates in the country’s foreign policies. Till recently, it has
hadveryweakpolitical andeconomic tieswith its neighbors
such asGreece andBulgaria alongwesternborder; Syria and
Iraq along its southeastern border and Iran and Armenialigholizadeh), yzaki@
arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haalong its eastern border. Among adjoining countries,
weakness in ties with Armenia, compared to others was
completely felt or it is better to say that therewere no ties as
such. In fact, after the Armenia occupation of Nagorno–
Karabakh in April 1993, Turkey closed its land and air routes
forArmenia (Demirag, 2005–2006: 75). Fromthenonwards,
the issue of Karabakh as the most important foreign policy
issue of Azerbaijan that is very close to Turkey religiously,
culturally, historicallyand linguistically, plays adetermining
role in Turkish relationship with Armenia. Moreover,
Armenia still does not ofﬁcially recognize Kars agreement
aimed to demarcate boundary between Turkey and
Armenia. Also, inclusion of the term “Western Armenia” in
Para 11 of the independence communiqué of Armenia its
territorial claim especially on a big part of eastern Anatolia
has been a principal problem in the way of their bilateral
relations. Another stumbling bloc in their relationship is the
widening propagation of Armenian Diaspora in the inter-
national arena and its apparent claim of “Armeniannyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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pressure on Ankara, politically and ﬁnancially (Çandar,
2009). With respect to equations acquired for these tense
relations that extensively inﬂuenced the national politics of
each of these countries especially Armenia, after years of
conﬂict and commotion, they have ﬁnally decided to
normalize their bilateral relations with collective coopera-
tion in the southern Caucasus. Although, the efforts remain
ineffective so far and the process of normalization is in the
state of suspension but there is no doubt that the continu-
ation of this process and normalization of ties would
accompany its own regional consequences. A glance on
these could give wider perspective about regional and
extra-regional ties in the southern Caucasus.
With reference to Turkish–Armenian differences as well
as geopolitical problem governing the southern Caucasus
especially the geopolitical problem of Armenia with
Azerbaijan and its isolation by both Azerbaijan and Turkey
that have had much inﬂuence on its shape and geograph-
ical location (Armenia has most of its borders with Turkey
and Azerbaijan), have also impacted the regional strategic
important in geopolitical equations of big powers espe-
cially its transit capacity in energy ﬁeld, trade and ﬁnancial
transaction and over all regional security. It is bit natural
that the ever growing importance of the southern Caucasus
has necessitated a review of Turkish–Armenian relation-
ship. Consequently, the current paper attempts to study
and analyze the consequences of normalization of Turkey–
Armenia relations, taking into account its geopolitical
angle. Therefore, the main question of this paper is: what
geopolitical consequences would accompany the normali-
zation of Turkey–Armenia relations?
2. Research methodology
With respect to its theoretical essence, the actual method
applied in this research is descriptive-analytical and for
documentation and indexing, library and Internet materials
have been used. In order to study the Turkey–Armenia rela-
tionship in thepast and thepresent times and their processes,
the paper, taking into account geopolitical views, tries to
analyze political and economic consequences of normaliza-
tion of such ties. Noteworthy, analyzing commercial ties of
TurkeywithsouthernCaucasiannations,dueto inaccessibility
to new resources, the above analysis could be based on2003–
2008 data acquired from the websites of the United Nations.
3. Theoretical bases of research
From geopolitical point of view, identiﬁcation of
geographical dimension of the research process is based on
the logical calculation and the analysis process in the
application of activities that havebeen left behind in thedue
course. By thisway, geopolitical analysis of the region can be
remembered as a suitable tool in assessing practical policies
of governments (Dadandish, 2007: 77–78). However, the
manner of geopolitical application overseeing the practical
geopolitical knowledge aims to remedyhumanneeds that it
is constructed like other terms and theories to the extent
that it is dependent on the world view, ideology, outlook
and interests of users (Hafeznia, 2007: 1). Practicalapplication of geopolitics or in otherwords, innate feeling of
geopolitical possibilities and understanding its deep impact
on political development enjoy long historicity. In reality, it
is geopolitical insight that causes the moral heroism of a
leader who leads people to the course he had not traveled
before. By thisway, newpowerful countries emergedwhose
creators easily understood the geopolitical needs. In other
words, only geopolitics could give political leaders essential
insight to identify actual needs for proper understanding of
the world. This knowledge establishes relations between
politics and geography and frees politics from useless and
meaningful theories that could probably entangle the po-
litical leaderships into unproductive and unreal desires.
Geopolitics convinces leaders to take into account a united
and integrated territory (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge,
2003: 91–92). Therefore, unlike traditional, the modern
geopolitics could be useful in boosting international coop-
eration and establishing peace. The modern geopolitical
system emphasizes and concentrates on evolution of the
political world as a systemenclosedwith different scales i.e.
from local to national and to transnational level and a
reciprocal spatial action and political process at all levels
(national, regional and international) creates and molds an
international geopolitical system (Cohen, 1994: 17).
4. Findings & research data
4.1. Turkey–Armenia relations & process of normalization of
bilateral ties
Armenia that has the weakest relations with Turkey
among its neighbors became independent in 1991 in the
aftermath of the disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union.
Turkey was one of the ﬁrst nation ofﬁcially recognized
Armenia on December 16,1991 and even did not hesitate to
send humanitarian aid to this newly independent country.
In 1992, apart from selling food grains to Armenia, Turkey,
with the reason that Armenia was facing oil sanction from
Azerbaijan, removed its electricity problems (Demirag,
2005–2006: 74). This issue was highlighted in a way that
Turkey with such humanitarian posture aims at establish-
ing direct relation with Turkish speaking nations in Central
Asia through the Armenian and Azerbaijani territories
hence; minimizes the growing pressure of the Armenian
Diaspora in the global arena. Further, with the establish-
ment of friendly relation with Armenia, Turkey wanted to
minimize Russian inﬂuence Yerevanda new step for
resolving Karabakh problem. Even before recognizing the
Armenian independence, the Turkish government, in April
1991 sent its ambassador in Moscow to Yerevan for talks
aimed at boosting bilateral ties and showed its inclination
to establish friendly relations with the newly Armenian
government. That is considered as the ﬁrst high level
meeting with Armenians (Özbay, 2011: 3).
However, considering that all countries try to establish
transit, trade, commercial, political and even military ties
with powerful regional countries and those with strategic
location, geopolitical realities including geographical loca-
tion, historical and cultural commonalities, aptitude to-
ward each other play important role in establishing these
ties (Valigholizadeh & Zaki, 2008: 22). The ﬁrst prime
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of its independence, gave a complete support for normali-
zation of Turkey–Armenia as well as Ankara as the best
choice for establishing direct relations with the West and
economic development of the country (Güngör, 2008: 18).
Patricianmade a lot of efforts to counter the negativemedia
propaganda against Turkey such as media projection of
Turkey as a threat to Armenia as well as improper historical
prejudices and wrong approach of the two sides toward
each other. Patrician even promised to counter such claims
in the freedom declaration of Armenia. In part of his speech
along Volkan Vural thus says:
“We cannot forget our past ever, whereas we also don’t
want to continue with such a past, we want to provide
better future for our children” (International Crisis
Group, 2009: 2).
By this way, initially and for a short span, good relation
continued between the two neighbors with the Turkish
invitation for Armenia to become a member the Organiza-
tion of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation that was foun-
dedbyTurkey itself. Despite goodbilateral relations in those
initial years, the Turkish foreign ministry did not approve
the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two
hence; with the intensiﬁcation of the Nagorno–Karabakh
problem and the Armenian occupation of the region, Turkey
closed its border to prevent military advancement of
Armenia on the territory of Azerbaijan and rejectedwestern
proposal of using Turkish land and air to send any human-
itarian supplies to Armenia (Demirag, 2005–2006: 75).
Despite this, Turkey in 1995, reestablished air link be-
tween Istanbul and Yerevan, showing gratitude and its
intention for ties with Armenia. In the meantime, with the
governmental order, Turkey began repair and renovatation
of cultural and artistic remains of Armenian in different
parts of the country (Özbay, 2011: 4). However, these steps
could not prove effective in normalization of ties hence,
with the arrival of President Robert Kocharian in 1998, re-
lations between the two entered into a difﬁcult stage.
Kocharian, with his insistence on the international recog-
nition of Armenian genocide by Turks a one of his priorities
in the Armenian foreign policies, took a complete hostile
turn toward Turkey (Lütem, 2007: 1033). In such circum-
stances, after the 2001 EU-Armenia Parliamentary Cooper-
ation Summit in Brussels, EUmembers invited both Turkey
and Azerbaijan to abborgate Armenian boycott arguing that
the continuation of such process would encounter problem
in thewayof Turkish entry to the EuropeanUnion (Demirag,
2005–2006: 75). Under this framework, the European
Parliament, in its special report on October 6, 2004
conﬁrmed to approve the issue of Armenian Genicide
(S¸ims¸ir, 2005: 238). However, to do away with such inter-
national pressures, Turkey proposed to openways for Turks
and Armenians to come together by using archives in the
two and other countries to study the issue. But the Arme-
nian government believes that the Turkey–Armenia differ-
ences are political andnone of the historian could solve it. In
other words, Armenia avoided any scientiﬁc research about
the alleged “genocide” and scaped historical realities to the
maximum extent. Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, in his speech in 2008 said:“We often encounter with this issue in the European
Union. Irrelevant claim never gives result. If the two
parties are sincere in their claims, we have displayed our
documents, you also come and show your archival
documents and let a group of impartial researchers and
historians study these documents, and whatever step is
needed, we will do that” (Fakir, 2005).
As a whole, the existing problems between the two
countries continue to prevail cold atmosphere in the future
bilaterla ties. Although, over the past two decades, as
mentioned earlier, a number of steps have been taken by
the two especially by Ankara for the normalization of ties.
Those steps include the Turkish–Armenian Business
Development Council (TABDC) under the framework the
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation that is
a non-governmental organization and the aims behind this
was to establish direct trade and cooperation between the
two countries (Kyureghian & Heboyan, 2004: 2). Further, in
2007, under the framework of efforts of the Turkish gov-
ernment for establishing ties with Armenia, Akdamar
Church in Turkey, after its repair and renovation was in-
augurated as historical and artistic museum in the presence
of Gagik Gorgian, Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Culture. In
the same year, air link between Anatolia and Yerevan was
reestablished. Apart, 2008 was considered an important
year, with reference to steps taken for normalization of
bilateral relations including application of “cheese diplo-
macy” and “football diplomacy” (Özdal, 2009: 70). As such,
a plan “Caucasian Cheese Circle” was presented with the
aim of establishing peace and cooperation in the Caucasian
region through normalization of Turkey–Armenia relation
(The Economist, 2008: 45). Apart, Turkish President
Abdullah Gül became the ﬁrst Turkish head of state to visit
Armenia on September 6, 2008 after he accepted the invi-
tation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to attend a
FIFA World Cup qualiﬁer football match between the
Turkish and Armenian national football teams. Both of the
presidents and their countries’ respective press reﬂected
positively on the visit setting the ground for a thaw in
diplomatic relations that is expected to have made great
progress in time for Sargsyan’s reciprocal visit to Turkey in
October to watch the return match (MFA, 2009a).
The most peak point of this process was steps by foreign
ministers of Turkey and Armenia to sign a ﬁve-point
agreement under the meditation of Switzerland in
October 2009. The agreement emphasized on the normal-
ization of relations, opening of borders, recognizing Kars
deal and joint study about the alleged 1915 genocide. On
this basis, the two countries prepared and agreed upon two
protocol: the ﬁrst about diplomatic ties and the second
about development of ties in different ﬁelds and domains
each of which with different contexts and paragraph and
some of them are as :
- Reciprocal recognition of borders between the two
countries based on international law.
- Opening of common borders
- Re-commitment with regard to avoiding any kind of
political step that could not be compatible to their
cordial relations.
A. Valigholizadeh et al. / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 197–206200- Establishing cordial relations with the aim to serve
nation and development of bilateral ties in political,
economic and cultural domains etc.
- Establishing diplomatic ties from time of the execution
of protocol and expansion of diplomatic representation
(MFA, 2009b).
These protocols are remembered as historical steps for
boosting ties between the two countries. Itwas decided that
the protocols, after signature, would be sent to respective
parliaments and would be executable once approved by
legislative bodies. However, in April 2010, issuing a state-
ment, Armenia declared that since the Turkish parliament
did not approve the protocols in a reasonable time, it is
necessary to stop the execution process of the protocols
with Turkey. In this statement, it was emphasized that until
Ankara prepares to follow up the protocols without pre-
conditions, the Armenian parliament would not hold a
debate on this issue. These steps were taken at the time
when the Supreme Court of Armenia accounted the two
protocols as legal in January 2010 and despite the fact that
Armenia insisted that it had not abrogated the protocols and
only suspended the normalization process, Turkey avoids
approving these two protocols in parliament.
Although Turkey had criticized Armenia for halting the
process of normalization of ties but in reality, the Turkish
authorities were worried after they encountered with
fundamental problems for getting parliamentary approval
for the above protocols. The most intense problem was the
effort of opposition groups for exploiting this by portraying
the weakness of the government as well as its non-
achievement on the Turkish scenario. To minimize the
growing criticism of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turks
wanted that by organizing trilateral meeting of Azerbaijan,
Turkey and Armenia, it would try to free ﬁve of seven
townships under the occupation of Armenia in return for
Karabakh and opening of the borders hence; it would be
able to turn the public opinion from deepening of Turkey–
Armenia relations and it would suggest that Ankara’s ac-
tions about the normalization of relations is in the interest
of Azerbaijan.
As a whole, the process of normalization of ties that
intensiﬁed after signing of the two aforementioned pro-
tocols aimed at establishing diplomatic ties that was
faltered with a sudden and unexpected statement by the
Armenian government and hence, was a severe blow to the
normalization process. However, after the declaration of
the Armenian Supreme Court that approval of protocols
does not mean Yerevan’s connivance to the issue of
Armenian genocide, practically, Turkish hopes faded away
referring to overcoming this issue and recognizing borders
of the two countries from the side of Armenia.
5. Main obstacle in normalizing Turkey–Armenia
relations
In their bilateral ties, both Turkey and Armenia have
strategic interests beyond merely relying on diplomacy.
The advantage and beneﬁt of these long-term objectives
impel these two countries more toward détente. Armeniawill follow strategic aims and objectives such as mini-
mizing structural military and economic dependence on
Russia, removing land blockade and exit from geopolitical
isolation, solving national ﬁnancial crisis and peaceful
transition to free economy as well as response to social
crisis like preventing wide-scale migration of Armenians
and weakening the position of Azerbaijan. Access to these
aims depends upon strategic, political and mental changes
toward its western neighbors. Turkey also focused on its
important aims such as minimizing the US and the Euro-
pean pressures for opening of borders, entry to the Euro-
pean Union, help strengthen regional security and solve
Karabakh problem under the framework of UN Security
Council resolutions, preventing damaging prestige of
Turkey due to continuous claim of Armenian genocide,
quick and conformable advances of projects of transferring
Caspian sea and Central Asian energy resources to Europe
and strong inﬂuence and presence in the Caucasian region
in its competitionwith Russia and Iran. Realizing important
parts of these aims completely depends on Ankara’s revised
policy with regard to its relations with Armenia
(Banihashemi, 2009: 138–139). However, there are other
factors affecting the approaches of these two countries and
have brought them to the dead end. It is to the extent that
one cannot be certain about the future bilateral ties. This
political dead end and trends can be briefed as follows:
- With reference to complex geopolitical realities of the
Caucasian region, probably it can be said that none of
the factors is more effective than the issue of Nagorno–
Karabakh in geopolitical relations of Armenia with
Turkey and Azerbaijan. The issue of Nagorno–Karabakh
has tied up to geopolitical interests of these three
governments, in such a way that its role cannot be
ignored for political dead end between Azerbaijan,
Turkey and Armenia. Evidently, on the one side, any
positive compromise between Azerbaijan and Armenia
would lead to easing of other problems between
Turkey and Armenia or vice versa. On the other, with
respect to deepening geopolitical ties between
Azerbaijan and Turkey, undoubtedly any relation be-
tween Turkey and Armenia without taking into ac-
count the interests of Azerbaijan would create friction
in Turkey–Azerbaijan ties (Valigholizadeh, 2010: 96).
- The Armenian government, without any basis, iden-
tiﬁes the 1915 incident by Ottoman rule as genocide
and has often emphasized this issue in the interna-
tional arena. The efforts that were often entertained by
some European powers and Americans not only
damaged the international status of Turkey rather
deranged the economic and political relations of
Turkey with any country that ofﬁcially identiﬁed the
Armenian claims (Banihashemi, 2009: 125).
- Armenia does not completely recognize its borders
with Turkey. Apart, the declaration of freedom and the
Armenian constitution apparently includes the alleged
genocide claims as well as territorial claims on east of
Anatolia (Anadolu, 2009). In these documents, a term
“Western Armenia” is also visible and above all, there is
a statement about extraterritorial rights and cordial
Graph 1. Turkey’s total trade with southern Caucasus – data reference (UN
Comtrade, 2007).
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Armenian government (Kamer, 2009). Likewise, in its
ofﬁcial researches, Armenia uses AraratMountain (Agrı
Dagı) located inside the Turkish territory as its symbol.
Even, the name Ararat is abundantly seen in different
domains such as cinema or the naming of cities. In
other words, this trend has no conformity with its pure
intention.
- This action and similar political behavior in a way cause
obstacle in the way of Turkey–Armenia relations. As
discussed before, the inﬂuence of Diaspora and pres-
sure groups in Armenia show their existence. These
pressure groups, in every circumstance, have been
critical to efforts of the Armenian government for
mending ties with Turkey hence; they force it to retreat.
In the same way, growing social sensitivity with regard
to this issue in Turkey too has made the governmental
efforts more difﬁcult. This difﬁcult condition, though,
may not be in the present existing condition in Armenia
but Turkey has been encountering with other obstacles
aswell and that is the government of Azerbaijan. People
of Azerbaijan and Turkey consider each other as “one
nationwith two governments”. And through this, it can
be understood the importance the Karabakh dispute
between Azerbaijan and Armenia enjoys among the
Turkish nation. In fact, this was the real reason of
closing border posts between Turkey and Armenia.
Thus, it can easily be perceived that any inclination of
the Turkish government for opening of borders with
Armeniawould encounter with opposition from people
and the government of Azerbaijan. Indeed, the expec-
tation of the people and government of Azerbaijan in-
cludes conditional normalization of ties and opening of
borders, throwing Armenia out of occupied region and
solution of Karabakh dispute under the framework of
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
6. Place of Armenia in commercial ties of Turkey with
southern Caucasus
From geo-economic point of view, the southern Cauca-
sus enjoys special importance in the foreign trading
domain of Turkey and an assessment shows a rising com-
mercial ties of Turkey with regional countries. Actually,
with respect to domestic and international economic
scales, this region with about 16 mn population cannot be
considered such macro-economic values but its commu-
nication and strategic location makes it the most advan-
tageous. The Turkish export to the southern Caucasian
countries was nearly $340 mn in 2003 that grew to 488% in
2008 and comparatively reached to about $2000 mn.
Considering Graph 1, the Turkish export to these regional
countries was noticeable year-by-year. In the meantime,
the highest volume of Turkish import from this region was
worth $1228 mn, themost remarkable part of it was related
to oil and gas from Azerbaijan.
It is noteworthy that the total Turkish export to Armenia
in 2007was $267 mn that alone accounted to 13% export to
Caucasian countries. However this ratio, compare to
$33 mn in 2003, shows a growth of 710%. In the meantime,
imports of Azerbaijan and Georgia with $807 mn and$916 mn from Turkey were 3 and 3.4 times the Turkish
export to Armenia. Similarly, the total trade of Turkey with
Azerbaijan and Georgia between 2003 and 2008was nearly
$5184 mn and $3640 mn respectively that was 8.5 and 6
times of the total Turkish trade to Armenia in the same
period with $613 mn. Other important point is that the
total Armenian import in 2008 was $4101.2 mn which
included 15% of the Turkish export. This ratio was 3.68% in
2007.
As can be observed in Graph 2, Turkey had no imports
from Armenia between 2003 and 2008. As such, Armenia
has the weakest trading ties in the southern Caucasian
region. Armenia, not only lacks commercial ties with
Azerbaijan rather according to a 2008 data, though the total
foreign trade of Azerbaijan with Georgia was $813 mn, this
ratio for Armenia was just $117 mn.
Evidently, in case of normalization of Turkey–Armenia
relations and resolution of Azerbaijan–Armenia disputes,
the development of regional economic cooperation is not
improbable. Consequently, along with regional growth and
transitionwould also help boost volume of Turkish trade to
the region. In reality, the current level of ties, taking into
account annual growth of trade, the continuation of this
trend is certain. In the existing circumstances, with refer-
ence to macro economic indicators of regional countries,
growth dimension seems impossible in short span how-
ever; the existing potentials of these countries are funda-
mentally unable to create a space for such a wider growth.
Specially, in case of normalization of Turkey–Armenia re-
lations, based on existing evidences, one cannot expect
higher growth in the existing volume of the Turkish trade. If
we take into account Turkey–Georgia commercial ties, the
total volume of the Turkish trade to Georgia was about
$1178 mn in 2008 that naturally includes a share of indirect
Armenia import from Turkey. In other words, due to the
Graph 2. Turkey’s foreign trade with southern Caucasus countries – $ mn.
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sided trade could take place indirectly via Georgia.
Moreover, a comparison of Armenia based on its eco-
nomic and population indices shows that the country not
only enjoys the lowest populationwith regard to the extent
of market rather the rate of GDP growth is also smaller than
other regional countries. Based on this, as Graph 3 shows,
Armenia in comparison to Azerbaijan has the highest vol-
ume of trade with Turkey, has a population less than half of
Azerbaijan and its GDP growth is also far away from the
existing level of Azerbaijan. As such, it is a fact that Armenia
would not have remarkable commercial ties with Turkey
considering its existing economic potentials. Despite this,
one cannot ignore geo-economic importance of Turkey–
Armenia ties in the wake of changing foreign policies of
Armenia as well as fostering acceptable and logical foreign
policies (Table 1).
Considering earlier discussion, the assessment of devel-
opment of Turkey–Armenia tieswould only be the imperfect
bilateral perspectives. On the other side, theneed to take into
account the region as a collection must be the real basis of
the discussion. In fact, with growth and development of so-
cial, political and economic ties between regional countries
and their ratio of inﬂuence upon each other, the regionalGraph 3. Turkey’s total trade with southerneconomies can gradually enjoy better potentials. That is the
pointwhere Turkey’s trading tieswith regional countries can
witness remarkable growth. Although, frompolitical pointof
views, normalization of relations with Armeniawould boost
Turkey’s regional status but economic achievement seems
impossible in a short span.
With regional stability, the most important advantages
of economic and political ties of Turkey, apart from growth
of regional exports, can be creation of ideal condition for
transfer of energy resources through Armenia. Moreover,
the growth of little export potential of eastern cities of
Anatolia in the vicinity of southern Caucasus, minimizing
security danger of eastern borders, revival of economic
condition of border towns and minimizing migration from
eastern region of Turkey can be other social advantages of
its relations with Armenia, although, the effect of such re-
lations in a short and average spans should not be
exaggerated.
7. Geopolitical consequences of normalization of
Turkey–Armenia relations
With reference to present strategic ties of southern
Caucasian countries as well as strategic importance of theCaucasus from 2003 to 2007 – $ mn.
Table 1
Population and GDP growth rate in southern Caucasus (2007).
Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia
Population 8.58 3.07 4.38
GDP Growth Rate 25 13.7 12.3
Reference: The World Bank, 2013.
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doubtedly, the normalization of Turkey–Armenia relations
would lead to transformation in regional geopolitics and
geo-economic equations. These transitions, from the point
of view of each government of the southern Caucasus, pe-
ripheral powers and world hegemonic players are of much
importance.
In the internal regional dimension, transformation in
Turkey–Armenia relations could be an important sensitive
point in determining the fate of the Karabakh crisis. This
transformation, contradictorily, inﬂuences the two gov-
ernments of Azerbaijan and Armenia. At a ﬁrst glance,
development of Turkey–Armenia ties weakens the situa-
tion and regional backing of Azerbaijan. As seen, the ﬁrst
sign of this transition caused for time a cold relationship
between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The expectation of the
people and government of Azerbaijan includes conditional
normalization of relations and opening of borders,
throwing Armenia out of the occupied region and solution
of the Karabakh dispute under the framework of territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan. Based on the strategy of Ankara, on
one side security and economic motives of Turkey and
Azerbaijan for Armenia vis-a-vis resolving the Nagorno–
Karabakh crisis and other occupied region, are important
cards and tools to convince Yerevan in future. On the other
side, putting condition to boost ties from Turkey to accept
Security Council resolution from Armenia based on
resolving and settling the Karabakh dispute under the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, an important legal pres-
sure pyramid on Yerevan to the world public opinion as
well as request to big powers for peaceful resolution to the
crisis (Banihashemi, 2009: 135–136).
In the international political economy, ownership and
control of energy routes can have wider strategic proﬁts
like access to cheaper energy for domestic needs, secured
investment, transit incomes and inﬂuence on the ﬂow of
energy resources and its use as political and security
pressure pyramids (Saghaﬁ-e Ameri & Taghizadeh, 2008:
26–27). However, the lack of diplomatic and economic ties
of Armenia with Turkey and Azerbaijan has caused lack of
possibility of utilizing geopolitical potentials to strengthen
national economy and continued attachment to Russia.
With no resolution of the Karabakh crisis, Armenia is
excluded from big international and regional economic
projects in Caucasus and facing boycott and isolation more
than before. Omission of Armenia from important energy
transit projects like Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Baku–Tbilisi–
Erzurum gas pipelines and its non-participation in the
under construction Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway line project
and Ankara–Baku–Tbilisi expressway would incur long-
term strategic and economic damage for Yerevan. Like-
wise, absence of Armenia in these projects especially
NABACO plan means loss of historical economicopportunities, energy safeguard and even regional security
and separation of political and economic fate of Armenia
(Banihashemi, 2009: 129).
In fact, the economic boycott and the Armenian isolation
by Turkey and Azerbaijan caused big gap in economic and
communication cooperation domain in the southern Cau-
casus. From this, the development of Turkey–Armenia re-
lations in the medium term and Armenia–Azerbaijan
relations in the long-termwould pose a great obstacle in the
way of economic structures of the Caucasian region and the
isolated Armenian economy would be linked to dynamic
economy of Turkey (Ferit Temur, 2009) and developing
economy of Azerbaijan. This important transition can be
considered as an introductory step toward the entry of
Armenia to regional and global economy. However, the
entry of Armenia in this process is a strategic aim of this
country. In other words, this transition, on one side, re-
sponds to domestic crisis and on the other side, an impor-
tant step in the course of economic freedom of this country
and minimizing its structural economic dependence on
Russia. The result of this transition in the medium and long
run is dominance of economic logic on behavior and re-
lations of Caucasian countries, decreasing military and
defensive expenditure as well as driving it toward economic
developmental substructure. Perhaps, the most important
outcome of Turkey–Armenia ties would be the beginning of
fundamental transformation in the domain of energy and
communication routes. However, it must not be ignored
that the Armenian entry into energy transit arena as well as
big projects like NABACO and Trans Caspian and likewise its
participation in the communication projects in southern
Caucasus such as Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway line, Baku–
Ankara expressway, and Black Sea coastal expressway are
conditional to the resolution of the Nagorno–Karabakh
crisis.
From the point of view of the Iranian proﬁt, it must be
pointed that Armenia is the only non-Muslim neighbor of
Iran and had the least political and security challenges to
Iran among its all Muslim neighbors and perhaps, the
main reason is the Armenian need of Iran in order to
establish its contact with the outside world and establish a
kind of balance of power in the southern Caucasus. With
reference to the fact that Armenia has problem with
Azerbaijan on its eastern border on the issue of Karabakh,
it too feels insecure in the north after August 2008 in-
cidents with Georgia and in the west, it has fundamental
problem with Turkey. It would be unrealistic to imagine
that Iran–Armenia relations would be completely inﬂu-
enced by the development of Yerevan–Ankara ties. How-
ever, this new transition would certainly limit the Iranian
presence in the political and economic equation of Cau-
casus with respect to relieving Armenia from traditional
attachment with Iran (Koozegar Kaleji, 2009: 18). Other
event is also remarkable i.e. if Turkey fails to preserve
Azerbaijan’s national interest in the course of its normal-
ization of ties with Armenia, certainly we will witness to
Turkey’s rejection by Azerbaijan and at the same time its
closeness to Iran. This is also true about Georgia. In fact,
distancing of Georgia from big economic projects as well
as ﬂow of foreign trade of Armenia could incline this
country more toward Iran.
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particular extra-regional outcome. After the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, special regional system gradually
emerged in Caucasus with three main players i.e. Russia,
Iran and Turkey. In fact, security, historical and cultural
interests of these countries as well as three others in the
southern Caucasus led to gradual coordination and détente
between themwhere Russia, Iran and Armenia are the one
side and Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the other. Over
the past two decades, each of these groups has expanded
political and economic cooperation and competition in the
form of some of the organizations or big regional projects.
Since, Armenia and Turkey are on the reciprocal regional
competition and the past hostile relations have provided a
particular identity, a transition in their relations would
break the bipolar regional system that has strengthened in
the last two decades. In other words, Armenia’s entry to
this process that is unavoidable to eliminate boycott,
geographical isolation and renovation of economic and
industrial substructures could change the regional power
equation in the favor of Turkey.
From the point of view of western interests i.e. Europe
and the United States, development of Yerevan-Ankara ties
means shortening of space for Russia and Iran in the Cau-
casus especially in the ﬁeld of energy, especially with two
crucial Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and NABACO projects. The
Turkey–Armenia ties could provide suitable ground for
American inﬂuence in the Caucasian equation. From the
point of view ofWashington, with its active participation in
regional equations, Armenia’s dependence on Iran and
Russia will be diminished and could bring this Christian
country with enough cultural similarities with the western
world as well as its strategic location closer to the West
(Koozegar Kaleji, 2009: 19). Armenia would take a big step
in case of normalization of its relations with Turkey. Like-
wise, there are two factors in determining the European
Union attitude toward the region. One is effect of existing
and under-constructed energy pipeline projects in the re-
gion on the energy security of the EU. Second is the Euro-
pean cooperation policy especially with its intension to
help six republics of erstwhile Soviet Union. With this
attitude, cooperation with Ukraine, Moldavia, Belarus,
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been anticipated in
different domain such as backing of governmental organi-
zations, economy as well as border security (Çomak, 2009).
In the meantime, it seems that Kremlin, too, is trying to
adjust its relations with Armenia based on its ties with
Azerbaijan and Turkey because, from its geopolitical in-
terest to counter NATO strategy, Russia needs at least
normal relationship with Azerbaijan and Turkey. In fact,
Russia relentlessly tries to keep America away from
regional problems hence; has tightened its grip over Cau-
casus. Among other reasons, Russia’s closeness to
Azerbaijan is a powerful pressure that it incurs on Armenia.
On the other side, Moscow tries to proceed with three-
minus-one choice (Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia minus
Georgia), by keeping Azerbaijan away from Georgia, it has
isolated this country and placed it at bottleneck (Caucasus
Bulletin, 2008: 42). Although, Russia did not lose any-
thing in the last brief war with Georgia, however, consid-
ering its bad experience, does not want the region towitness another conﬂict and in reality, the regional peace in
the way of Russian interest is the utmost desire of Moscow.
Moreover, with its support to the normalization of Turkey–
Armenia relations, Russia wants to attract the attention of
Turkey and develop Moscow’s ties with Ankara as well as
protect reciprocal conﬁdence that have emerged between
the two sides over the past few years (Aras, 2009).
Russia is in the process to have good relationship with
both Armenia and Azerbaijan. From the Russian point of
view, while Armenia is important in strategic and military
domain, Azerbaijan enjoys enough energy and ﬁnancial
resources. On the other side, Russia considers itself in a
position that it is obliged to attract the satisfaction of the
two. Likewise, with the reopening of Turkey–Armenia
border, a principal part of the Armenian trade would be
accomplished through Turkey’s Trabzon port instead of Poti
Port of Georgia. This means, following its aim, Russiawill be
able to dismiss the Georgian monopoly on the Armenian
trade. It is worth to mention that Russia, apart from mili-
tary victory in Georgia, also accomplished a political victory
by giving ofﬁcial recognition to the freedom of Abkhazia
and Southern Ossetia. By this way, a complete secession of
its relations with Georgia became more and more evident
with the Armenian isolation. From Russian point of view,
reopening of Turkey–Armenia borders, development of ties
would bring calm to Russia’s strategic partner of Armenia in
southern Caucasus hence; would free it from Georgian
attachment. Moreover, with normalization of Turkey–
Armenia relation, energy pipeline and communication of
the West would transfer to southern region i.e. Armenia
from Georgia. However, in case of reemergence of a war
between Baku and Yerevan, the past scenario would be
repeated and Russia would be on the Armenia side while
Turkey would come on the Azerbaijani side hence; such an
incident can easily cause friction in Moscow–Ankara ties
that are currently considered the biggest trading partners.
Strategic outcomes of normalization of relations from
the point of views of Turkey are distinct from others. The
renormalization of Turkey–Armenia relations is considered
a kind of diplomacy to establish peace (Sanberk, 2009).
From the point of view of Turkey that has taken important
step for its dream membership of the European Union, re-
lations based on peace and stability with neighboring and
peripheral countries enjoy special importance. Under the
framework ofmulti-dimensional foreign policies, Turkey, on
the one hand follows the policy of rapprochement and
resolving problems with its neighbors through dialog and
on the hand, with the aim to create a peace band in its
surrounding, it poses itself a mediating player in regional
crises. In fact, if nothing is achieved from Turkey–Armenia
ties, the essence of Turkey’s peace efforts will be in question.
With the idea of assistance to establish a ground of coop-
eration in the region and Turkey’s collaboration to establish
regional stability was aimed at normalizing bilateral re-
lations. Boosting its relations, Turkey would certainly evolve
itself a big regional power (Aras & Özbay, 2009: 7–8).
Likewise, Turkey follows the policy of strengthening ties
of southern Caucasian countries with the West and weak-
ening Russian inﬂuence on these countries. Turkey’s
advanced relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia lucidly
explain this aspect. Simultaneously with mending Turkey–
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closeness to theWest would seem a great victory. Likewise,
the normalization of ties would lead to the presence of
Turkey’s private sectors in the Armenian market hence;
would revive trade in southern Turkey. Simultaneously,
taking international energy and communication routes
through its territory, Turkey wants to transform itself the
most important energy transit country in the world that is
only possible with regional peace and security. The trou-
bling Turkey–Armenia relations thus are considered a main
obstacle.
8. Analysis & ﬁndings
With due attention to what has been discussed before,
despite some big obstacles in the way of normalization of
Turkey–Armenia relations, with reference to regional
geopolitical realities, development of bilateral ties could be
a great opportunity and distinct bottlenecks in regional
geopolitics. Presently, Armenia is considered the weakest
country in the southern Caucasus but with respect to the
geopolitical condition, it is playing key role in the region. In
other words, foreign policy orientation of this country is
more positive in geopolitical formation than the rest of
countries. As such, a change in the foreign policy of this
country toward peripheral nations especially Turkey and
Azerbaijan can bring ups-and down in the total geopolitical
equations of the region. In fact, the normalization of bilat-
eral ties and withdrawal of Armenia from economic and
territorial isolation, taking into account political, economic
and security structures of Azerbaijan and Georgia espe-
cially in regional stability, would gradually decrease the
Armenian attachment to Iran and Russia from defensive-
security aspect as well as economy and energy and would
strengthen ground for presence and participation of
Armenia in security and economic projects of the West
hence; strong presence of Turkey industrial, commercial,
energy sectors in Armenia and the whole Caucasus and
even in the Central Asia would be smoother. As such, if
Turkey could boost its ties with Armenia under the
framework of national interests of all regional countries
then perhaps it can be said that Turkey would swallow the
whole region, providing that the whole region acts in
coherent way. This also as other regional countries do not
have satisfactory relations with the two northern (Russia)
and the southern (Iran) fronts. Moreover, the normalization
of Turkey–Armenia relations, other than the interests of
regional countries, would be proﬁtable for Armenia only. In
other words, ignoring interests of other regional countries
in the process of normalization of such ties would simul-
taneously lead to loss of Turkey’s interests in Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Consequently, Turkey would not only lose the
game in mending ties with Armenia rather will lose its
current place in the region. As such, what most political
experts believe in evolution of Turkey’s place in the region
would not be accomplished so easily. Again, in case Turkey
attracts the satisfaction of the whole region, even in that
case, it cannot be hopeful of major short-term geopolitical
and geo-economic achievements. Evidently, based on pre-
dictions, in case Turkey and Armenia are unable to attract
the complete satisfactions of Azerbaijan and Georgia intheir bilateral ties, it is expected that with such ties, in a
short term, and cross displacement of strategic friendship
in the region would lead to a kind of lateral weakness and
strength of traditional ties between players that cannot
consider the above process constant and results may be the
establishment of a kind of extra-regional power balance
and ties in the southern Caucasus.
It is worth mentioning that safeguarding the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijanwith resolving the Karabakh dispute
is the most important factors in the national policies of this
country. Since, the Karabakh issue is tied up with geopo-
litical games of big regional and extra-regional power, the
issue has encounteredwithmore complexity. By this way, it
can be imagined that without taking into account the in-
terest of Azerbaijan, the normalization of Turkey’s ties with
the biggest historical enemy of Azerbaijan could put re-
lations between these two historical partners at odd. In
fact, if Azerbaijan feels that it is placed in the bottleneck on
the issue of Karabakh from its greatest friend and ally, it
would lead to the biggest and the heaviest geopolitical
isolation of Azerbaijan in its post-freedom period. However,
geopolitical logic shows that Turkey is following its own
beneﬁt in the region and would not cease its proﬁt by
sacriﬁcing Azerbaijan.
From the point of views of dominant regional powers
too the probable outcomes of the normalization of Turkey–
Armenia ties has encountered with particular complexities.
For instance: from Russian point of view, the normalization
of Turkey–Armenia relations as well as resolution of the
Karabakh crisis would help bring Azerbaijan and Turkey
closer to Moscow and this will remarkably diminish the
Western inﬂuence in the region. Moreover, role of Russia
will increase in the geopolitical equation of the region. On
the other side, from the West’s point of view, the normal-
ization of Turkey–Armenia relations as well as resolution of
the Karabakh crisis would help bring Armenia closer to the
West. Although the bilateral ties are directed to big eco-
nomic plans of the west, however; one cannot see the
simultaneous descent (from Russian point of view) and
evolution (from western point of view) of western place in
the region. As such, the normalization of Turkey–Armenia
relations perhaps couldmaintain a kind of balance between
dominant powers providing that such bilateral ties take
into account the interest of other regional countries.
Otherwise, as told before, neither Turkey will be successful
nor others by changing strategic friendships. In fact, it is
Russia that will be the only victor in this sensitive game
with the fulﬁllment of Azerbaijani auspices.
9. Conclusion
With reference to what has been discussed above, the
southern Caucasus region, especially due to its location on
the energy transit route to the EU, it is also important for
Europe so far as the security is concerned. As such, the EU
supports the expansion of Turkey–Armenia relations. From
the European point of view, this issue is linked to the pro-
cess of Turkey’s membership to the European Union. The
US, too, wants the early resolution especially it gives much
importance to issue in order to safeguard the security of
energy pipelines. Likewise, Russia, in order to fulﬁll its own
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ties. However, with respect to geopolitical logic, such a
consensus from big powers has only tactical dimension and
undoubtedly is not ever lasting.
From the point of view of Turkish interest in the region,
an assessment of commercial ties of regional countries re-
counts the presence of a very weak economic and trading
network. Similarly, economic and population indices of
Armenia indicate that this country does not enjoy much
economic potentials. However, if we take into account the
development of Azerbaijan–Armenia ties in the shadow of
the normalization of Turkey–Armenia relations, in such a
case the economic growth and gradual expansion of region
commerce would not be impossible. Naturally, in such a
condition, development of Turkey’s commercial ties with
Armenia would not cause bitterness so far as Azerbaijan or
Georgia is concerned. Furthermore, in such circumstances,
geo-economic importance of the region would provide
ground for the EU, the US and Russia for investment hence;
economic competition between these big powers would be
more than before. To accomplish all, bilateral ties between
Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan, fostering complete
coherent political and logical decisions are necessary along
with resolving all existing obstacles.
As a whole, with respect to geopolitical process, a single
dimension to the normalization of Turkey–Armenia ties
would result in failure. This issue alonewould lead to tactical
and sectional changes in the relationships of southern
Caucasian countries with regional and extra-regional players
hence; with respect to the essence of ideological interests, it
would not remain constant for either side. Consequently, the
whole region must be taken as a coherent collection and the
acquired results from this collection must also be put to
assessment. The normalization of Turkey–Armenia relations,
in short or long-term, would be beneﬁcial for both Armenia
and the region as a whole. However, politically, in case of
fulﬁllment of the above aspect in the medium-term, a long-
term Turkish interest could be discussed as well. Because,
the Turkish efforts for establishing regional stability, apart
from strengthening international as well as geopolitical
status, would be to boost its inﬂuence in the Caucasian re-
gion. And so, with this process, one more obstacle seems to
be removed from the way of its becoming member of the
European Union.
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